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 Abstract 
 This paper assesses the impact of foreign involvement on the effectiveness of political 
reform organizations in Jordan. Through the qualitative analysis of the democratization work of 
completely foreign-funded international organizations, partially foreign-funded Jordanian 
organizations, and Jordanian organizations that do not receive foreign funding, derived from 
several interviews conducted with democracy practitioners in international and local NGOs, 
political activists, scholars, and others, this paper examines the effect of foreign involvement on 
organizational strategies, credibility, and effectiveness, ultimately arguing that foreign 
involvement (and conversely, the lack thereof) has several effects on the way political reform 
organizations have carried out their activities. This study can hopefully be used to help both 
foreign and Jordanian policymakers and activists understand the way in which foreign 
involvement can help and/or impede democratic progress in Jordan. 
ISP Keywords: Democratization, Political Reform, Foreign Funding 
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Introduction 
 Western governments have been interested in democracy promotion programming since 
the end of the Cold War. The fall of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new democracies 
across Eurasia led to a huge need for civil society assistance, democratic participation trainings, 
rule of law reform, elections expertise, and other types of democracy-focused programming—
programming that was formerly small-scale and largely experimental (Carothers, 2009). But 
while Eastern European countries liberalized, countries in the Arab world remained largely 
authoritarian. In Jordan, western governments run several democracy promotion programs, 
largely with the goal of creating a culture of democracy and representative government in the 
country. But the impact of such programs is debatable. While some experts believe that foreign 
and foreign-funded programs play a helpful role in promoting democracy in Jordan, other experts 
believe that their work is ineffective, citing the current authoritarian situation as evidence 
(Dempsey, 2018; Haring, 2015; Khakee, 2009). Despite almost 30 years of western-funded 
democracy programming, Jordan remains undemocratic.  
However, Jordanians themselves have organized independent of foreign-funded bodies in 
order to promote political change. During the 2011 Arab revolutions, the case of Jordan was 
quieter, without mass mobilizations or calls for the fall of the regime. But a series of smaller 
nonviolent protests from January 2011 through December of that same year generated enough 
pressure to push King Abdullah to enact some political reforms. In response to the protests, the 
king reformed the Constitution and created an Independent Election Commission. Five years 
later, in 2016, he established proportional representation for the House of Representatives and 
introduced reforms to the judiciary system, all moves that helped to liberalize the government 
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and create a slightly fairer playing field for opposition groups. At the same time, however, King 
Abdullah retains ultimate control over the government of the country, with many experts arguing 
that the political reform package enacted was simply a top-down measure designed to quiet 
internal opposition and concerns from the West (Barari, 2013; Yom, 2013a). The fact that 
political reforms were enacted and yet had a highly questionable impact on accountable 
government raises questions concerning the extent to which political reform may be possible in 
Jordan, and how it may come about. On one hand, local pressure managed to push the 
government to enact changes. On the other hand, the changes were largely superficial and 
implemented by a heavily pro-government committee.  
My interest in democratization policy largely stems from the historical context of my 
childhood, where the Iraq War loomed in the background. The need for this war confused me—
trillions of dollars were spent and thousands of lives were lost, all with the political justification 
of “democracy promotion.” Democracy, to me, was a good thing. Representative government 
was something we should be promoting as a nation with power and privilege. But was invading 
countries and causing catastrophic sectarian tensions the best way to do so? I have since been 
drawn to the question of whether western governments indeed can help to promote democracy in 
authoritarian countries, and if so, how they should go about promoting it. The case of Jordan is 
particularly interesting to study because both foreign and local bodies have been involved in 
trying to promote democracy through the use of soft power and public pressure respectively, 
with limited success. Studying the impact of foreign involvement (and conversely, lack of 
foreign involvement) on political reform organizations in Jordan can generate greater knowledge 
on how foreign bodies, foreign-funded local bodies, and independently-funded local bodies 
affect institutions of power and what kind of change they are able to produce.  
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 This paper assesses the impact of foreign involvement on the effectiveness of political 
reform organizations in Jordan. Through the qualitative analysis of the democratization work of 
completely foreign-funded international organizations, partially foreign-funded Jordanian 
organizations, and Jordanian organizations that do not receive foreign funding, derived from 
several interviews conducted with democracy practitioners in international and local NGOs, 
political activists, scholars, and others, this paper examines the effect of foreign involvement on 
organizational strategies, credibility, and effectiveness, ultimately arguing that foreign 
involvement (and conversely, the lack thereof) has several effects on the way political reform 
organizations have carried out their activities. This study can hopefully be used to help both 
foreign and Jordanian policymakers and activists understand the way in which foreign 
involvement can help and/or impede democratic progress in Jordan. 
Definitions  
Political reform will be defined as reform toward democracy, which requires a definition 
of the term, “democracy.” While a so-called “liberal democracy” often brings many elements to 
mind, such as protection of individual liberties, legal protections for minorities, gender equity, 
and (ideally) government responsiveness to citizen needs, determining a base condition for what 
a democracy is provides the simplest way of determining a non-negotiable status of democracy. 
For the purpose of this research, the base condition for a democratic society is fair, competitive, 
and regular elections for offices of power, which allows citizens to hold their governments 
accountable and enforce the social contract. In addition, it is important to note that all lawmaking 
office branches must be accountable to the public. Even with the fairest, freest elections, a state 
cannot be democratic if a significant proportion of its governing power comes from an unelected 
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body. Without fair elections for offices of power, a government cannot be democratic (Dahl, 
1979; Downs, 1985; Yom, 2013b).  
Democracy assistance will be defined in accordance with Thomas Carothers’ definition, 
which describes it as “aid specifically designed to foster a democratic opening in a 
nondemocratic country or to further a democratic transition in a country that has experienced a 
democratic opening” (Carothers, 1999).  “Foreign-funded international organizations” shall be 
defined as organizations that are based in foreign countries and funded by foreign countries, in 
this case, specifically for the purpose of political reform/democracy assistance. A “partially 
foreign-funded” civil society organization shall be defined as a civil society organization that 
receives foreign funding for its primary activities, but may also receive contributions locally. 
“Civil society” shall be defined according to the World Bank’s definition, which describes it as 
encompassing “a wide array of organizations: community groups, non-governmental 
organizations [NGOs], labor unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based 
organizations, professional associations, and foundations.” This term is most often used to 
describe organizations that serve to check institutions of power and hold them accountable.  A 
“locally-funded” civil society organization shall be defined as a civil society organization that 
does not receive foreign funding for its activities. This does not mean, however, that individuals 
partaking in such an organization have not benefited from foreign funding in the form of 
individual training, NGO participation, etc.  
Literature Review 
The State of Jordan’s Government 
 Jordan’s governmental structure is officially a constitutional monarchy, with separation 
of executive and legislative powers and an independent judiciary. The Jordanian Parliament has 
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the power to pass laws and hold debates, and the most recent elections have been determined to 
be free and fair according to international observers (Singh 2017, 297). However, the Jordanian 
Parliament does not have the power to introduce laws or introduce a budget. The Parliament only 
has the power to approve laws and a budget introduced by the government—which is ultimately 
established by the king.  
The Parliament is not allowed to ask questions about military matters, national security 
matters, matters of intelligence, foreign policy decisions, policing decisions, and other issues 
relevant to the security of the state. The Prime Minister also lacks the power to hold military 
officers to account regarding budgeting, strategy, or anything else that can be interpreted as 
having to do with national security (S. Yom, personal communication, June 19, 2018).  
In the end, it is the monarch (currently King Abdullah II) who holds the most power over 
the executive and legislative branches, with the power to single-handedly select the Prime 
Minister and all Senate seats. In addition, the Prime Minister he selects generally does not come 
from the elected parliament, but rather from the political elite who occupy cabinet positions or 
are otherwise highly favored by the king. The monarch also has the power to approve and fire 
judges, sign or veto laws passed by Parliament, and suspend or dissolve Parliament. Parliament 
does have the power to overrule the king’s veto with a two-thirds majority vote, but the king’s 
power to dismiss Parliament, handpick senators, and declare a state of emergency at will give the 
monarch ultimate control over all branches of government and all pieces of legislation that go 
into effect.  
 In response to the protests in 2011, King Abdullah established the National Dialogue 
Committee, with the stated goals of recommending specific political reforms that could be taken 
to address the concerns of the populace. Some of these proposals were implemented. The Public 
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Assemblies Law was amended to allow public demonstrations with forty-eight hours notice, 
without the previously required approval from an administrative governor. The Independent 
Election Commission was established as a tool of creating a body of nonpartisan oversight over 
elections. But despite these reforms, there has been significant criticism that these reforms only 
provide an illusion of progress while maintaining the status quo; a government system where the 
monarch holds absolute power in the end.  
Theoretical Framework 
Adams (1998) theorizes that western democracy promotion operates in the pursuit of 
three main interests; humanitarian interests, political interests, and economic interests. 
Humanitarian interests refer to altruistic reasons for promoting democracy abroad, such as 
helping citizens of authoritarian states gain representative government. Political interests 
typically refer to a donor state’s wish to enhance political leverage through aid, giving 
democracy aid primarily to strategic allies needed for the donor state’s security. Economic 
interests refer to the donor state’s hope of securing resources and gaining wealth through trade. 
He continues to argue that countries generally do have altruistic interests, but these interests 
come second to political and economic interests. Other scholars have gone further to 
compellingly argue that countries that promote democracy often sabotage their own efforts in 
democracy promotion when they legitimize authoritarian regimes to achieve security goals. 
Support of illiberal regimes through military and economic aid can reinforce the power and 
legitimacy of these governments, counteracting the power of political reform efforts (Borzel 
2014; Barari 2013). Building on Adams’ theory, I hypothesize that conflicting state interests 
have a direct impact on political reform organizations in Jordan.  
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Western funding of democracy aid has also been theorized to reduce the credibility of 
democracy. The history of the U.S. supporting dictatorships in countries such as Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia, and Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war have created a perception in the Arab world that the 
U.S. is a hypocritical country when it comes to democracy promotion (Singer, 2007; Hamid, 
2011). One study done by POMED, the Project on Middle East Democracy, found that although 
democracy as a form of government was very popular among Jordanians, U.S. promotion of 
democracy was viewed much more negatively. A 2006 Zogby International poll cited by 
POMED found that only 10 percent of Jordanians believed that U.S. democracy promotion 
efforts improved their perception of the United States, while 72 percent said that U.S. democracy 
promotion efforts gave them a more negative impression (DeBartolo, 2008). Building on the 
results from these opinion polls, I hypothesize that low credibility creates a significant barrier for 
organizations that receive western funding.  
Multiple scholars argue that the effect of democracy aid is a reflection of state interests 
(Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Easterly, 2002; Hancock, 1989). If a state has political and economic 
interests in a country, that state is likely to prioritize those interests—which often require regime 
cooperation—over democratic interests. In the case of Jordan, changing interests over time affect 
how states choose to allocate democracy aid. Bush (2015) suggests that democracy promotion 
has become “tame,” with western programs investing primarily in regime compatible programs 
that avoid being overtly political. These organizations focus primarily on issues such as elections 
management, women’s civic engagement, and local governance—issues that may be valuable to 
address, but do not have a particularly significant impact in an undemocratic state. Bush goes 
further to argue that the implementers of democracy work on the ground have an interest to 
pursue tame, regime compatible democracy promotion because they want to ensure 
  
13 
organizational survival. Programs that are more active in supporting dissidents, political parties, 
and unions—the kind of programs that were much better supported in the 1980s and 1990s in the 
Soviet Union—risk trouble with the government, and organizations that engage in these kinds of 
programs are likely to face increased interference. Tame projects help to ensure organizational 
survival, both because these types of programs are more measurable and ensure an inflow of 
foreign aid, but also because these are the kinds of projects least likely to cause trouble with the 
government. Building on Bush’s work, I hypothesize that funding has jeopardized the 
sustainability of NGOs while also encouraging them to pursue “tame” democracy promotion 
because of the political interests of donor states.  
As Locke and Rousseau argued, government must derive from the consent of the 
governed. (Contemporary Approaches to the Social Contract, 2017). One of the main reasons 
that the Jordanian government enacted any reforms at all was because activist movements in 
2011, also known as the Hirak, had heavy participation from East Bank tribal youth, and East 
Bank tribal families had historically been the bedrock of the regime’s support and legitimacy 
(Yom 2014, 229). Ignoring the will of the people risked the Jordanian government falling apart 
in the same way as the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt. Still, Barari (2013) argues that the lack of 
international support for Hirak and internal divisions created a situation where the regime was 
able to create top-down reforms largely drawn up by pro-government elitists. Based on Barari’s 
ideas, I predict that this study will find that while internal pressure is a necessary condition for 
reform, it is not enough.  
Barari and Yom argue that neither foreign involvement nor the lack thereof has had a 
substantial impact on the effectiveness of political reform strategies in Jordan, based on the fact 
that INGOs, NGOs, and completely locally-based groups have all had little success in pushing 
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for systemic reform (H. Barari, personal communication, November 25, 2018;  S. Yom, personal 
communication, June 19, 2018). However, I argue that foreign involvement still plays a role in 
how organizations choose to operate and how successful they are, even if it does not 
independently determine the course of events. While previous studies have primarily analyzed 
one organizational type at a time, this paper aims to assess the effect of foreign involvement 
across civil society types. And while most studies have analyzed political reform organizations 
by looking for the variable causing certain phenomena, this study aims to look at the phenomena 
caused by a particular variable. Looking at democracy assistance through this lens can hopefully 
develop a broader picture of the effect of foreign involvement on democracy promotion. Through 
side-by-side empirical analysis, this paper aims to help democracy practitioners, activists, and 
scholars understand specifically how foreign involvement or lack thereof affects political reform 
organizations/strategies, particularly in terms of organizational strategies, credibility, and 
effectiveness, a clear understanding of which can help build better foreign policy and better 
activism.  
Foreign-Funded International Organizations: An Overview 
While numerous foreign organizations participate in activities to encourage political 
reform in Jordan, one of the most significant organizations is USAID, which alone spends 85 
percent of the $3 billion the U.S. spends on global democracy assistance (Haring, 2015).. At the 
same time, as shown in Figure 1 (Bush, 2015), democracy aid makes up a very small component 
of U.S. aid to Jordan, which has consisted primarily of security and economic support, even 
during the years of reform in 2011 and 2012.  
 The U.S. also distributes democracy assistance dollars through the private non-profit 
National Endowment for Democracy. The National Endowment Democracy in turn distributes 
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approximately half of its funds to four organizations; the American Center for Labor Solidarity, 
the Center for International Private Enterprise, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), and the 
International Republican Institute (IRI). Interestingly, there has not been a significant amount of 
scholarship conducted concerning the work of NED’s main partner organizations, although they 
are often cited in lists of democracy organizations in Jordan. While the first two organizations 
focus primarily on labor and free market issues, the latter two, NDI and IRI, are focused more on 
political reform. NDI’s work in Jordan primarily focuses on youth political participation and 
parliamentary strengthening, while IRI’s work in Jordan has focused on municipal governance 
and training for civic leaders. Both NDI and IRI have women’s empowerment programs and 
collaborate on elections monitoring. IRI has also been well-known in Jordan for conducting 
highly-regarded opinion polls on democracy-related issues in Jordan.  
 
Figure 1 American aid to Jordan, by sector, 2006-2012. 
                                  Note: Aid is in constant U.S. dollars.  
                                 Data source: ForeignAssistance.gov.  
 
IRI also specialized in political party development work until 2017, when USAID cut funding 
for the program, deciding the program was not on track to meet the goals it was designed to 
achieve.  
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NDI and IRI are well-known in Jordan, particularly for their civic education trainings. 
20,000 students have graduated from NDI’s civic training program for university students, Ana 
Usharek. IRI documents many alumni who have gone on from their training programs to enter 
positions in local elected office and civil society. Some activists in popular movements in Jordan 
have received training from NDI and IRI, although it is unclear how common it is for activists to 
receive such training. NDI and IRI have been allowed to operate in many very undemocratic 
regimes, but have also been looked upon with suspicion. After Hosni Mubarak was ousted in 
Egypt, Mohammed Morsi’s government raided the offices of IRI, NDI, and eight other civil 
society organizations, arresting and charging 19 American employees. The Russian government, 
which has recently banned NDI and IRI from working within its borders, carries the view that 
NDI and IRI are CIA-like agencies designed to subvert the government (Smith, 2013). However, 
the Jordanian government has a largely positive relationship with both NDI and IRI. This paper 
examines both NDI and IRI (through anonymous sources) when accounting for the impact of 
foreign involvement on political reform. 
 Non-U.S. organizations are also involved in promoting political reform. In 2005, the 
European Union created an EU-Jordan European Neighborhood Policy with the goals of 
promoting dialogue on democracy, developing an independent and impartial judicial system, and 
furthering freedom of the press. Another EU-sponsored program in Jordan is EU-JDID, which 
has a stated focus of parliamentary support, electoral assistance, and support to the political party 
system. However, European democracy promotion programming falls into most of the same 
problems that U.S. programming does. Preferring stability and security, European countries 
sacrifice their pursuit of democratic ideals and human rights when they contradict those efforts 
through other policies. A lack of communication between different EU institutions—including 
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ones focused on democracy promotion—also leads to a lack of cohesive strategy, with some 
institutions reinforcing the role of the government while others aim to challenge it (Jonasson, 
2013).  Most western institutions are engaged in activities that challenge the regime while at the 
same time engaging in activities that reinforce its authority.  
Partially Foreign-Funded Jordanian Organizations: An Overview 
 Civil society organizations emerged in Jordan in the 1990s, as Jordan pursued an IMF-
sponsored agenda of economic liberalization that required Jordan to cut subsidies and borrowing 
from the domestic banking system, resulting in a decrease of services provided by the Jordanian 
government. As a result, civil society organizations stepped in to fill the gap, particularly in the 
area of providing welfare services. This time period also resulted in some degree of political 
liberalization as the government began to once again allow political parties and associations to 
develop, leading to the formation of the first political reform oriented NGOs. 
However, formal civil society organizations in Jordan face a considerable number of 
burdens. In the absence of a culture of NGO support, NGOs are almost entirely dependent on 
foreign funding for their survival. 91 percent of CSOs focused on democracy promotion and 
political reform receive foreign funding, with the average organization receiving funding from 
five international donors (Bush, 2015). Because of their dependence on foreign assistance, the 
aid they receive is largely dependent on the interests of foreign governments at particular 
moments in time. For example, Sweden and Norway both took funds out of their international 
aid budgets to accommodate the costs of refugees coming to their countries, effectively reducing 
the amount of aid that was generally distributed abroad for the purpose of civil society and 
democracy support (UN alarmed by Swedish development aid cuts, 2015). Foreign interests also 
force NGOs to negotiate significantly with their donors in order to implement the programs they 
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want to implement. While most organizations do have a say in the kinds of projects and 
programming they do, they will not be able to do them unless they get funding, which is 
contingent on approval from foreign governments. Any project that does not have the 
sanctioning of foreign donors will not be funded and will inherently not be put into place .  
Government regulations also significantly hamper NGO activity. Societies that receive 
foreign funding may not have any “political goals” and are restricted from any activities that can 
be construed as the “activities of political parties.” Meanwhile, the state’s security department, or 
the Mukharabat, must approve all NGO registrations, elections, leaders, and members (Jarrah, 
2009). Repeated attempts by the regime to pressure activists, use state security institutions to 
limit operations, and restrict public freedoms in the name of security have prevented civil society 
organizations from operating to their fullest extent. Provisions of the Prevention of Terrorism 
Act (PTA) allow the Jordanian government to punish individuals who contribute to organizations 
that support terrorist groups, even if they are not aware of the connection. This contributes to 
reluctance among Jordanians to donate to civil society groups, and forces international 
organizations to give a significant amount of control over resource distribution to the Jordanian 
government, which argues that it can identify terrorism better than foreign groups (Interviewee 
O, personal communication, December 6, 2018).  
In 2009, Jordan passed a law making it easier for NGOs to register, but increased 
government regulation of their work. Now, organizations must obtain approval from the Ministry 
of Social Development to legally operate. When an organization wants to register with the 
government, the MSD is supposed to give an approval or denial within three months. However, 
the Ministry can slow down the process by demanding significant amounts of extra information. 
In addition, the Ministry can deny an organization a license without having to give reason for the 
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denial, and judicial and administrative appeals are mostly unavailable as an option for 
organizations that feel they have been unjustly denied legal standing (Shutting 2007). 
Jordanian organizations are also often dependent on support from ministries and royal 
NGOs (or RONGOs) in order to survive, with 38 percent of organizations working in the 
democracy promotion sector receiving some funding from the Jordanian government (Bush, 
2015). The funding provided to these organizations gives the government an excuse to co-opt 
and control their activities. Events and workshops are highly monitored by the regime, often by 
members of Jordan’s General Intelligence Directorate (GID). Organizations do not have the 
ability to conduct workshops, trainings, or organizational meetings without fear of being spied 
on by informants of the regime, and this significantly impedes on their ability to operate 
effectively. Organizations with foreign funding are eyed with particular suspicion and are more 
likely to be closely monitored, especially if their objectives include political reform and/or 
democracy promotion. 
The kinds of projects local NGOs are able to pursue are also dictated by the NGOs’ 
desire to survive in an environment that is both competitive and unfriendly to political reform 
organizations. Sarah Bush argues that civil society organizations that receive foreign funding are 
very likely to pursue “tame” democracy promotion projects that are regime compatible (such as 
women’s participation projects) rather than more confrontational and substantial democracy 
promotion projects (like legislative advocacy) because they primarily aim for survival. Foreign 
donors prefer more measurable programs that tend to be less confrontational, and more 
confrontational and controversial programs face a higher likelihood of being hampered by the 
government. This results in a significant amount of resources being put toward projects such as 
women’s empowerment or elections operations, areas that do not have a huge amount of 
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meaning in a country that is non-democratic. Most civil society organizations in Jordan have also 
not actively engaged in legislative lobbying. Only 19 percent of civil society organizations 
interact with legislators more than twice a month, 51 percent of organizations interact with 
legislators once or less per month, and 29 percent do not interact with legislators at all (Abdel-
Samad, 2017). The lack of communication channels that exist between CSOs and legislators 
hurts the ability of civil society organizations to communicate with those with influence and 
power who may be supportive of work they are doing.  
Civil society organizations that receive foreign funding sometimes face issues with public 
legitimacy. Many Jordanians eye western-funded NGOs with suspicion due to American and 
European policies regarding Israel and Iraq, worrying that support of such organizations may be 
implicitly supporting western foreign policies (Bush, 2015). Even though democracy-focused 
civil society organizations generally depend on foreign funds in order to operate, foreign funding 
generally results in increased legal bureaucracy and a loss in public trust. 
Civil society organizations are also internally weak. NGOs within Jordan tend to have 
poor financial transparency, short-sighted goals, and ineffective management. One argument in 
favor of the 2009 NGO law was that it required NGOs to meet specific standards of transparency 
and management, such as conducting board elections on a regular basis (Jarrah, 2009).   
Local Organizations Without Foreign Funding: An Overview 
 The organization of protest movements in 2011 and 2012, often referred to collectively as 
the Hirak, was instrumental to the mobilization of individuals across Jordan and was enough to 
pressure the Jordanian government to enact reforms. The Hirak was primarily made up of three 
constituent bodies; the Muslim Brotherhood; a scramble of youth protest groups; and various 
tribal groups, although the term is sometimes used to strictly refer to the youth from tribal groups 
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(Barari, 2013). The collective mobilization of these three groups helped to generate the push 
needed for some democratic changes in the country. 
Sean Yom (2014) suggests that the independence of the youth who participated in the 
protests helped them achieve their goals. Youth who participated in protests and demonstrations 
against the regime in 2011 and 2012 specifically stated that they wished to remain separate from 
political organizations already existing and attempted to use their lack of formal, elitist 
organization as an asset. In the wake of the Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt, the Hirak groups 
demanded three reforms. The first reform was to amend the Constitution, particularly articles 30 
and 35 which gave the king unlimited power to select cabinet officials, dismiss parliament, and 
manage the country’s security apparatus. Second, the Hirak wanted to amend the Elections Law 
in order to reduce the effect gerrymandering had on parliamentary elections. Third, Hirak wanted 
to fight corruption. 
         Hirak was moderately successful in its efforts, mostly due to the movement’s persistence 
in organizing protests and effective lobbying of the National Dialogue Committee and 
Parliament (Interview K, personal communication, December 3, 2018). The fact that the group 
was made up of members of almost forty tribal groups, groups that had always been thought of 
as loyal to the authoritarian regime, pressured the Jordanian government enough that they 
approached the activists with caution. In the political context of the Arab revolutions, where 
authoritarian governments were being regularly toppled by the people, the regime understood 
that it could not ignore the demands of protesters. Yet the regime did not want to give up its 
power. In September 2011, the king ratified some constitutional amendments, but maintained his 
unhindered power over the government, resulting in more protests from Jordanian youth 
activists. In 2016, the government introduced proportional representation to the parliament, and 
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the Islamic Action Front Party participated in elections for the first time in years. Freedom House 
also moved Jordan from a ranking of “not free” to “partly free.” But in the same year, Jordan’s 
parliament amended the constitution to give the king greater power over the court system, 
Senate, and security institutions.  
     Hirak was unable to achieve more than the top-down reforms that emerged after the 2012 
protests. Barari (2013) argues that Hirak’s lack of alliances with international partners, internal 
fragmentation, and lack of clarity in political goals have all kept it from having significant 
influence in the government. Because Hirak’s constituent bases are so different and have very 
different ideas about what a democratic Jordan should look like, the organization has not been 
able to convey a clear message to the Jordanian government about its desires and has not been 
able to generate enough pressure to force the government to listen to public demands. The 
Jordanian government was also successful in cultivating distrust between Hirak’s various parties, 
convincing Hirak’s youth and tribal divisions that the Muslim Brotherhood division was 
attempting to use Hirak to create an independent deal with the state. 
         The Jordanian government has also taken action to crack down on Hirak. In September 
2013, eleven Hirak activists were tried before the State Security Court in the same month that the 
government stated it would restrict the Court’s intervention in activist organizations. These 
arrests are typically legitimized under the argument that incitement against the state supports 
terrorist activity, especially when such incitement may concern the Muslim Brotherhood. These 
random arrests, unsubstantiated by evidence of wrongdoing or actual terrorist activity, harm the 
reputation and efficacy of activist organizations by hampering participation and blocking 
organizing activities. 
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Some groups of youth that have organized since the Arab Spring have organized through 
informal means in order to avoid detection by intelligence agencies and law enforcement. These 
youth organizations are organized heavily by informal networks, making it difficult to establish 
exactly how many such groups there are and to what extent they are active. But these groups 
have shown evidence of making waves in their communities and on a national level.  
One organization that has attempted to make waves is a grassroots youth movement 
called Shaghaf, formed in 2016. The group is primarily made up of both tribal and non-tribal 
young people from poorer areas of Jordan and is uniquely disassociated from Islamist groups, 
leftist groups, and western NGOs. In fact, the group has purposely avoided the funding structures 
of typical Jordanian civil society organizations, rejecting funding from western donors. While the 
group has to raise all of its funds from inside Jordan, its locally-based funding structure protects 
Shaghaf from the optics of pursuing a western agenda.  At the same time, many of Shaghaf’s 
activists have received training from INGOs or NGOs, and some similar youth organizations do 
accept small amounts of foreign funding, generally from NDI or IRI. However, the money they 
accept is generally in amounts small enough that it would not look suspicious to constituents.  
In the light of the war in Syria and regional instability from terrorism and violence 
throughout the region, many Jordanians have been wary of loud opposition, fearing instability. 
Shaghaf has gained credibility because unlike Hirak, it does not participate in protests or 
boycotts, mostly because the organization sees them as ineffective in creating more than surface-
level change. Shaghaf has gained support because its activism primarily focuses on increasing 
government accountability. The organization has hosted debates between candidates, created a 
database to keep track of campaign promises, and formed committees designed to hold 
government officials accountable for solving problems on both a local and national level. The 
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group has gained prominence in the headlines because of their focus on practically solving 
immediate problems by holding government officials accountable. Their quiet way of making 
change poses a problem for the Jordanian government. The group is actively making citizens 
more active in their communities and more willing to challenge officials (Yom and Al-Khatib 
2016). However, due to the fact that Shaghaf makes change without protesting or throwing 
rallies, and has high support in Jordan, particularly in the rural areas the regime has traditionally 
depended on for support, the government cannot easily call the group a “security threat” and 
curtail their activities.  
Political parties, which are not allowed to receive foreign funding in Jordan, have also 
pushed for political reform. The most active and organized party in Jordan is the Islamic Action 
Front (IAF), the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, and it has been one of the major 
players in pushing for democratization, although some doubt whether they have the best interests 
of Jordan at heart. After the initial protests in 2011, King Abdullah offered Islamists an increased 
role in the new government, but the Muslim Brotherhood refused, saying it wanted an elected 
prime minister with fair elections. It continued to protest along with tribal and youth activists and 
boycotted the 2013 parliamentary elections, accusing the government of gerrymandering. In 
2016, after the introduction of candidate lists, designed to encourage political parties, the IAF ran 
as part of the National Coalition for Reform, a coalition that included Islamists, tribal candidates, 
and other minorities. The NCR ran on a platform of ending corruption and creating a “civil state 
of democracy” (Timreck, 2017). While the IAF has continued to lobby the government for 
relatively radical democratic changes, such as an elected prime minister, most other political 
parties have not been advocates of political reform, mostly because they lack the organization to 
be able to do so (Interviewee F, personal communication, November 19, 2018).  
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Methodological Framework 
 In order to investigate the impact of foreign involvement on political reform 
organizations in Jordan, I interviewed 16 individuals, including scholars, democracy 
practitioners, NGO employees, and activists, to get information about their experiences and 
thoughts about the role of foreign democracy promotion. All but one of the interviews was 
conducted in-person in Amman. I arranged most of the interviews by cold calling democracy 
promotion organizations in Amman. I also benefited from the assistance of Dr. Sean Yom, a 
professor at Temple University who has studied authoritarianism and democracy extensively in 
Jordan. He was kind enough to connect me with some of his colleagues in Jordan, who helped 
me get connected to other valuable contacts. I conducted most of the interviews at the 
workplaces of the interviewees, but occasionally met with individuals in coffee shops for their 
convenience.  
 In order to evaluate the impact of foreign involvement, this evaluation analyzed 
organizations through a multi-faceted framework that focused on understanding the goals, 
successes, and failures of the organizations interviewed, as well as how foreign involvement 
affected these areas. As repeated themes—to be precise, specific areas where foreign 
involvement seemed to play a role—showed up throughout the course of interviews, I took the 
extra step of asking about these common themes; namely, organizational strategies (in terms of 
how they were able to operate, what kinds of project they implemented, etc.), credibility, and 
effectiveness.  
 All of the research participants signed a consent form agreeing to participate in the 
research. The consent form was written in both Arabic and English and I asked all interviewees 
to read and sign whichever one they felt more comfortable with, to make sure that they 
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understood what my research would entail. Because the topic of research is politically sensitive 
and I wanted research participants to be open about their thoughts, I chose to protect the 
identities of all participants through the use of anonymity of name and organization and I 
avoided recording interviewees. To maintain the integrity of my data and avoid any 
misunderstandings, I took detailed notes of my interviews, and occasionally followed up with 
interviewees over email or text if I needed any clarification. 
My primary obstacle was getting some NGO and INGO employees off a public relations 
script. NGO and INGO employees were very eager to talk about the activities of their 
organizations and their successes, and tended to pivot to comfortable talking points whenever I 
asked about more sensitive areas, such as organizational weaknesses or the impact of foreign 
funding. When this happened, I tried to ask more specific questions that were difficult to stray 
away from. I would also spend some time asking interviewees about their thoughts concerning 
organizations they were not a part of, to get a variety of third party opinions on the organizations 
I was speaking with. It was also somewhat difficult to probe into politically-sensitive issues—
such as the impact of working with ministries and RONGOs—while also being culturally 
sensitive and respectful of people’s attitudes. I handled this obstacle by trying to be as open-
ended as possible on such questions and hiding any bias I had developed through literature or my 
personal background.  
 My initial proposal aimed to assess the impact of foreign involvement on the 
effectiveness of political reform organizations, but I soon realized that effectiveness would be 
quite difficult to evaluate. Different political reform organizations engaged in different activities 
with different purposes, valuable in different ways, and evaluating effectiveness would have 
required me to make quite a few assumptions regarding what effectiveness was. Because of this, 
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I decided to instead focus on assessing the ways in which foreign involvement and the lack 
thereof affected political reform organizations. This addressed a gap in existing literature while 
also allowing for a higher quality analysis that did not rest heavily on my assumptions as an 
individual.  
Findings 
Foreign-Funded International Organizations 
 In accordance with previously-cited literature by Bush (2015), programs conducted by 
international organizations with full foreign funding tend to fall into the category of “tame” 
democracy promotion, with international programs focusing heavily on civic engagement, 
capacity building, and women’s empowerment, programs that may indeed have short-term 
positive impacts, but fail to directly address Jordan’s undemocratic political institutions. 
Building on this previously established idea, however, this study finds that the foreignness of 
INGOs specifically contributes to tame democracy promotion for two reasons; first, because 
foreign governments and INGOs want to maintain a good relationship with the Jordanian 
government; and second, because organization leaders are wary of the idea of pushing down 
change from the top, both for optical and altruistic reasons.  
 The kinds of democracy promotion programming most common among the INGOs 
interviewed fell into the categories of civic education, capacity-building (for both citizens and 
political party members), and municipal development. The programs varied in their degree of 
success. One European organization specializing in youth training, political party training, and 
technical assistance to the Ministry of Political and Parliamentary Affairs admitted that they had 
not been successful in creating party coalitions and could not cite a large number of successful 
alumni from their youth training programs. However, their program has existed in Jordan for a 
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little more than a year. Two American organizations with a much more established presence in 
Jordan cited a much greater track record of training individuals who have gone on to run for 
office and work in civil society, although only one of these organizations engaged in long-term 
tracking of their alumni. A commonality between all the INGOs interviewed was that they were 
all engaging in work that was grassroots driven and regime compatible. None of the INGOs were 
engaging in programs dedicated directly to institutional reform. This is in large part due to the 
fact that foreign organizations, to varying extents, wish to maintain friendly relationships with 
the Jordanian government. Foreign organizations working on legislative reform or constitutional 
reform would give the appearance of foreign intervention, which would be looked upon with 
great distrust by the Jordanian government. Such top-down intervention would be seen as a 
threat to sovereignty and integrity and has the potential to disrupt international relations and the 
ability of international political reform organizations to work freely (Interviewee O, personal 
communication December 6, 2018) .   
 The extent to which foreign organizations choose to distance themselves from the 
Jordanian government varies. One European organization has a very close relationship with a 
government ministry, and is even housed in the building of this ministry. An employee of this 
organization said that one its primary obstacles to doing more substantive programming, such as 
increased engagement with political parties and public discussions on controversial topics, is the 
limits placed on it by the ministry. For example, the host ministry did not allow the organization 
to host public conversations about the ongoing tax law because they said it was “too 
controversial.” Tellingly, when asked why the organization had a relationship with the ministry 
in the first place, particularly if the ministry impeded its abilities to carry out projects, both 
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employees in the room let out a visible reaction of exasperation, with one of them putting her 
head to the desk. 
 “Good question,” the other employee said, raising his eyebrows in a cavalier expression.  
“Why do we work with this ministry?” (Interviewee H, personal communication, November 14, 
2018).  
 Neither employee knew why the organization had a relationship with the ministry—they 
figured that the partnership was established at higher levels of leadership. This may suggest that 
in alignment with theory, the “democracy promotion” the organization engages in may not really 
intended to promote democracy, but cement interests of donor states in other ways.  The fact that 
this organization spends a considerable amount of resources working on technical assistance to 
the ministry, rather than direct engagement work, suggests that the organization may actually be 
helping to legitimize authoritarian institutions, rather than democratize them. Interestingly, the 
employee I spoke with had not even heard of the European Neighborhood Policy. Consistent 
with Jonasson (2013)’s argument, communication and strategy between different EU institutions 
appears to be extremely poor, and likely contributes to failures.  
Some organizations, particularly the American ones, are considerably more independent, 
giving them more leverage to engage with parties and host more controversial discussions, but 
interviews with organization representatives also suggested a degree of wariness to confront the 
government on significant issues. One American organization said that it was engaging in 
conversation with the government about reform-related topics, but these discussions were 
happening “very diplomatically, very politely, and behind closed doors,” and do not make up a 
focus of the organization’s work (Interviewee D, personal communication, November 14, 2018). 
Another director of an American organization said that it was difficult to deal with issues such as 
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gerrymandering, identity politics, and more systemic political representation issues because these 
were highly sensitive (Interviewee H, personal communication, November 26, 2018). This 
representative believed that discussing these issues without seeming imperialist or threatening 
organization-country relations was one of the organization’s greatest challenges. It is a particular 
challenge when western governments engage in numerous other policies that lend support to the 
regime in pursuit of other interests, legitimizing and entrenching the authoritarian status quo and 
slowing the progress of democratic reforms. While some organizations are significantly more co-
opted than others, the extent to which many INGOs collaborate with Jordanian ministries 
inherently reinforces the legitimacy of very undemocratic institutions. INGOs are constantly 
trying to navigate a way between providing meaningful, democracy-promoting services and 
maintaining friendly relationships with the government that allows their programming to exist. 
This sometimes leads to a trade-off where both INGOs and the government operate in an implicit 
code of mutual non-interference. Although the closer an INGO’s ties are to a government 
ministry, the more control government ministries can and do tend to exert.  
 INGOs are sensitive to the idea that their positionality as foreigners makes their role in 
political reform controversial, another reason they backtrack from advocacy roles. The 
previously mentioned American INGO director said that he is hesitant to get involved in 
legislation because he believes that such advocacy would risk being perceived as an “American 
lobby” for an “American law” in the same way that the highly unpopular 2018 tax law has been 
largely seen as an “IMF law.” But he also believed that less foreign involvement in legislative 
action was not just good for optics, but for the country as well.  
“We would rather empower citizens from the ground up than be drinking tea in a back 
room telling the government, hey, pass this or that legislation,” he said. “I’m skeptical of top-
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down development. I think helping the grassroots is preferable to flying in and creating all these 
changes” (Interviewee C, personal communication, November 26, 2018).  
International NGOs are also sometimes viewed with suspicion by the public due to their 
foreign funding. The fact that INGO offices are primarily located in villas, without identifying 
information anywhere on or around their buildings, hints that INGOs may be wary of 
announcing themselves to the Jordanian public. However, anti-American views generally only 
affect organization programming as a result of controversial U.S. policy decisions made at 
particular moments in time and at high levels of government. In December 2017, after the United 
States moved its embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, several groups and individuals stopped working 
with political reform organizations funded by USAID, particularly the International Republican 
Institute. However, almost all of the groups that left ended their boycott of U.S. programs by 
February of 2018, with the exception of one group that had a high level of support for Salafi 
movements.  
The level of success INGOs have had on political reform in Jordan is difficult to evaluate. 
Most of the INGOs interviewed reported evidence of short-term successes. For example, the 
National Democratic Institute’s Ana Usharek program, which educates youth and university 
students about civic engagement, has reported success in engaging young people to deal with 
issues in their communities. For example, at the beginning of Ana Usharek’s 2015/2016 second 
semester program, 52 percent of participants said that they were currently active in community 
service or politics. At the end of the program, 75 percent reported being active (Ana Usharek, 
2nd Semester 2015-2016 Program Assessment, 2016). However, NDI does not track program 
participants past the end of the program, making it difficult to assess the long-term impacts of the 
program. While the International Republican Institute has a long list of program alumni who 
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have gone on to win public office and work in civil society, and a representative of one INGO 
said that after participating in its programs, women from Wadi Adaba who did not initially 
believe women should run for office began running and leading their municipal councils, the 
success of such organizations has been almost entirely extra-legislative. As such, it is difficult to 
assess the systemic impact of international organizations. Some activists and party members who 
have worked with such foreign programming have found international trainings to be helpful. A 
large number of activists in locally-based political movements and political parties participated 
in trainings with U.S. and/or European organizations (Interviewee E, personal communication, 
November 19, 2018; Interviewee F, personal communication, November 19, 2018). At the same 
time, it is impossible to prove a causality link between internationally-supported trainings and 
the effectiveness of public activism. One activist who now participated in the Hirak movement 
and runs his own political development non-profit organization stated that while he had received 
training from Ana Usharek, his participation in Ana Usharek was not the catalyst for his activism 
work, and he does not believe such programs are the catalyst for most political activists 
(Interviewee L, personal communication, December 3, 2018). While it is clear that a large 
number of people who participated in foreign-funded programs went on to work in civil society, 
run and win municipal and governorate offices, and participate in public protest, it is  difficult to 
generate a direct connection between training participation and later activities. The people who 
are likely to participate in political action trainings are likely to be already somewhat engaged in 
politics, and the same people are also the most likely people to be active in political movements. 
In addition, the INGOs that track the activities of program alumni tend to be organizations that 
hand-select participants for civic engagement workshops and training based on previous 
leadership and community involvement, ensuring an already civically-minded participant base.  
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As such, the common participation of individuals in both INGO programs and locally-based 
activist movements may be correlation based on personal characteristics rather than some kind of 
causation. While INGO programs have clearly graduated alumni who have gone on to further 
work in civic change, and while some of their work has resulted in change that may not have 
happened otherwise, it is difficult to establish a direct connection between the work of INGOs 
and broader movements for systemic change.  
 The foreignness of completely foreign-funded, internationally-based political reform 
organizations causes them to engage in tame forms of democracy promotion for two reasons. 
First, both the organizations themselves and the countries they belong to want to maintain good 
relations with the government in order to continue programming and pursue other policy 
interests respectively. State interests sometimes even lead to international organizations to 
collaborate extensively with the Jordanian government, legitimizing the current state of affairs at 
higher levels while supposedly advocating for political reform on the ground. Second, INGOs 
are wary of being western interventionists, some fearing bad optics and some believing that top-
down reform is not a good way of promoting democracy. In terms of effectiveness, INGOs may 
be effective at generating short-term change, and the fact that they are foreign does not generally 
affect how they are able to carry out programming. Many participants in semi-successful activist 
movements have also attend workshops led by international political training groups. However, it 
is difficult to link the success of these activist movements directly to INGO trainings.  
Partially Foreign-Funded Jordanian Organizations 
   In the absence of a culture of local support for NGOs, almost all registered NGOs in 
Jordan are partially foreign-funded. For political reform organizations, this is practically 
universal. Political development NGOs need foreign funding in order to survive, making them 
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highly reliant on scarce resources and subject to the ever fluctuating interests of donor countries. 
In the wake of major political changes, priorities of aid agencies often change and governments 
choose to redistribute resources. Some political reform organizations have been negatively 
affected by the Syrian refugee crisis, as donors have redirected large portions of their 
government and civil society budgets toward civil society programs designed to specifically 
address the needs of refugees (Interviewee I, personal communication, November 28, 2018, 
Interviewee K, personal communication, December 3, 2018; Interviewee L, personal 
communication, December 3, 2018). NGO representatives consistently mentioned the lack of 
sustainability in funding as one of their foremost challenges. They reported that it was very 
difficult to engage in strategic planning when funding is not guaranteed, and in turn, funding is 
unlikely to be given to NGOs that do not have strategic planning. The recent drop in funding for 
political reform organizations in the wake of the Syria crisis—which some also attributed to the 
desire of western countries to retain stability in Jordan—has resulted in some organizations 
disappearing entirely, while others have not been able to maintain projects and programs to the 
standard they want to.  Other organizations have refocused their goals on areas—particularly 
concerning the refugee crisis—where there is both more donor money and government support 
(Interviewee A, personal communication, November 8, 2018).  
Furthermore, in order to receive foreign funding, political reform NGOs have to design 
their programs according to the criteria set out by foreign mandates. This means that foreign 
governments have a direct line of control over what the NGOs do with the money they receive. 
While NGO goals and foreign government goals sometimes overlap, the system does not allow 
full autonomy. Organizations are fiscally incapable of doing any project that is not approved by 
donors ((H. Barari, personal communication, November 25, 2018). For example, one debate-
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centered NGO was asked to conduct an event on Article 308 of the Jordanian Penal Code, which 
allowed rapists to avoid punishment by marrying their victims. The NGO agreed to hold the 
event, but as a debate-centered NGO, it wanted to hold a debate where participants would argue 
both sides of the issue. The donors were against this proposition and withheld funding, 
preventing the event from happening (Interviewee K, personal communication, December 3, 
2018). One NGO representative criticized the fact that some donors ask organizations to do very 
specific projects within a particular time limit and with specific groups of people without having 
thoroughly researched the project’s potential. However, he also added that more autonomy 
would not necessarily make their organizations more impactful, saying that the way NGOs 
choose projects depends a lot on the individual people running them (Interviewee I, personal 
communication, November 28, 2018). A representative from a USAID contracting organization 
said that many NGOs do not know how to develop and maintain programs, and that funding 
NGOs that lacked monitoring and evaluation capacity with grants led to an inefficient use of 
resources (Interviewee J, personal communication, December 2, 2018). 
Jordanians tend to be somewhat skeptical of foreign-funded NGOs. The high salaries that 
NGO directors and employees receive creates a perception that these organizations are job-
providers more than democracy builders (H. Barari, personal communication, November 25, 
2018). In addition, the fact that most NGOs are headed by English-speaking, highly-educated, 
Amman-based leaders creates the perception that such NGOs are not representative of the 
Jordanian people and do not understand their problems and concerns (Interviewee L, personal 
communication, December 3, 2018). However, local NGOs feel that they have more success than 
INGOs in promoting their programs, because their names are Jordanian and their organizations 
are primarily driven by Jordanians. Foreign donors tend to understand that some people look at 
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foreign funding with suspicion and do not generally force recipients to publicly list their donors 
(Interviewee I, personal communication, November 28, 2018) .In general, negative perceptions 
of foreign donors do not seem to have a major impact on how successful or unsuccessful 
organizations manage to be.  
  The projects foreign-funded local NGOs tend to implement, as predicted by theory, tend 
to be what Bush refers to as “tame” projects. These projects are primarily aimed at empowering 
youth and women to participate in politics, monitoring elections, and assisting in the political 
reform process when the government provides an opening for new legislation to take place, but 
they do not aim to address systemic issues. Most NGOs are especially careful to avoid any kind 
of lobbying because they do not want to look like political parties, which are widely distrusted 
and prohibited from receiving foreign funds. Such lobbying would cause these NGOs to lose 
their professional standing and credibility with the government, further decreasing their 
autonomy and leverage with the government (Interviewee A, personal communication, 
November 8, 2018; Interviewee B2, personal communication, November 13, 2018).  
A few organizations are engaged in much less tame democracy promotion work, focusing 
on legislative and constitutional advocacy, community organizing, and youth empowerment 
programs that aim to have young people engage in more substantive policy-based activities. 
However, these few programs appear to be exceptions to the rule, mostly running the way they 
do because of the individuals who run them. It is also important to note that the level of success 
of more confrontational organizations is doubtful. Representatives of the more confrontational 
NGOs all said that they were able to enact the most substantial change during the political 
opening generated by the Arab Spring and the Hirak movement (Interviewee L, personal 
communication, December 3, 2018; Interviewee M, personal communication, December 3, 
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2018). This suggests that there is a larger problem beyond just “tameness” that causes democracy 
promotion NGOs to be unsuccessful, and that solving the problems behind tame democracy 
promotion will not necessarily push Jordan closer to democracy.  
Most civil society organizations are co-opted by the Jordanian government to varying 
degrees, often through individuals running such organizations and the means through which they 
obtain funds, and the organizations that get the most government funding tend to engage in 
significantly tamer programs. For example, one well-known organization that works primarily in 
parliamentary and government monitoring receives significant amounts of funding from foreign 
governments and significant amounts of funding from the Jordanian Ministry of Political 
Development, the King Abdullah II Fund for Development, and European organizations that tend 
to funnel their funding through RONGOs. Two independent sources active in political reform at 
both the INGO and NGO level also stated that the head of this organization had ties to the 
intelligence department, although this is not unusual (Interviewee C, personal communication, 
November 14, 2018; Interviewee K, December 3, 2018). According to Barari, the center’s co-
optation shows in the work it presents. While some of the monitoring the center does is valuable, 
such as keeping track of MP attendance and their level of participation, and while it has 
encouraged the government to adopt more transparent measures, such as information sharing 
websites, the center also shows all reports to the government before it publishes, allowing the 
government to respond to methodologies and share thoughts on the report, and the center often 
withholds publishing critiques of the government until the government solves the problem being 
critiqued. For example, a report critical of government-run websites was withheld for three years, 
as the center, in a representative’s own words, said their goal “wasn’t to embarrass the 
government” (Interviewee B1, November 13, 2018). Somewhat tellingly, in the same interview, 
  
38 
another representative of the organization condescendingly dismissed activists in the Hirak 
movement for acting like political parties, coarsely describing them as “communists” 
(Interviewee B2, November 13, 2018).  The fact that the center allows the government to 
monitor their work, withholds information from the public, and seems to carry rather 
condescending attitudes toward the activists most directly responsible for pushing for change in 
2011 and 2012 shows that systemic change is not a priority of the organization. Rather, the 
center and centers like it, in the words of another political reform activist “are tools to keep 
election and government observation under control” (Interviewee K, personal communication, 
December 3, 2018). But this particular center is not alone—in order for any organization to 
operate its programs, good relations with intelligence and government ministries is key. An 
organization that engages in unsanctioned programs risks being labeled as an opposition group 
and getting shut down—or in the worst case, having its leaders go to jail (Interviewee O, 
personal communication, December 6, 2018). 
The government also controls NGOs through the control of foreign funding. All NGOs 
that receive foreign funding have to get approval from the government, and while the 
government does not generally deny funding, it can delay it, and without money, the 
organizations cannot implement programming. Good relationships with the government and 
intelligence are key to avoiding trouble. One year ago, the head of an organization found himself 
on trial for misrepresenting his organization after a new intelligence officer replaced a former 
officer he had a relationship with (Interviewee O, personal communication, December 6, 2018). 
Organizations that engage in more confrontational or sensational programming face particularly 
heavy government surveillance. When the previously-mentioned debate-centered NGO would 
hold public debates, police and intelligence officers would attend the events and ask organizers 
  
39 
to hand over the content of the arguments before the debates began, although the debate 
arguments were not pre-planned. The debate organizer would hand over post-debate summaries 
to security officials in order to maintain good relations (Interviewee K, personal communication, 
December 3, 2018). While government surveillance tends to be common among political groups 
in Jordan regardless of whether they receive foreign funding or not, government officials often 
claim foreign funding as their excuse for increased monitoring (Interviewee O, personal 
communication, December 6, 2018).  
While some NGOs are independent from ministry funding and do not want to take funds 
from RONGOs, many donors—primarily western government donors—channel their funding 
through RONGOs, forcing NGOs to cooperate with RONGOs in order to be able to maintain 
programming (Interviewee I, personal communication, November 28, 2018). In turn, it is of 
interest that government donors channeling aid for the purposes of democracy promotion do so 
through undemocratic institutions, reinforcing their power while supposedly challenging them. 
The Jordanian government argues for such channeling in the name of national security, an 
argument that one representative of a development organization said was hard to combat, as 
Jordan was a sovereign nation and ally they did not want to disrespect (Interviewee O, personal 
communication, December 6, 2018).   
Foreign-funded Jordanian NGOs that work on political reform issues are directly 
impacted by the political interests of donor countries, who ultimately decide what kinds of 
organizations are going to receive funding, and in the context of Jordan, survive. Because NGOs 
depend entirely on foreign funding, foreign governments have the final say in what kind of 
projects NGOs are able to implement. Foreign funding makes Jordanians generally distrustful of 
NGOs, but does not significantly impact NGO programming. While Jordanian NGO programs 
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tends to largely be tame in order to avoid interference and ensure survival, both tame and 
confrontational programs tend to be largely unsuccessful at generating systemic change, except 
when an opening arises due to public pressure. The government also uses foreign funding as an 
excuse to co-opt and control NGOs, heavily monitoring their activities to make sure they do not 
step too far out of line.  
Local Organizations Without Foreign Funding  
The work of street protestors and independent activists during 2011 and 2012, also 
known as the Hirak, was key to putting pressure on the government, which enacted significant 
constitutional reforms in response to the political situation regionally. The movement had even 
more credibility because it was locally-driven, particularly by youth from rural areas that have 
traditionally been the bedrock of support for the monarchy. According to one activist, the 
movement would have simply not existed had western governments been remotely involved.  
“Mentioning anything related to western governments in public activism will result in 
people not following you,” he said. “If people are getting foreign funds, no one will listen to 
them, especially in rural villages” (Interviewee L, personal communication, December 3, 2018).  
 Some people in the INGO and NGO sphere have pointed out that many of the individuals 
involved in independent activism received training from INGOs and NGOs, and thus benefited 
from foreign training. However, as discussed earlier, it is very difficult to prove a link of 
causality between participation in foreign funded trainings and later participation in independent 
activism. Correlation is a much more likely scenario, with politically-interested individuals 
partaking in both trainings and activist movements, without one necessarily inspiring 
involvement in the other. Almost all of the individuals who developed the specific constitutional 
proposals that were delivered to the National Dialogue Committee and parliament had partaken 
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in some form of INGO or NGO political training, but according to one activist who was heavily 
involved in the proposal process, they never ended up using the skills taught to them during 
trainings to advocate for their proposals, which ended up being successfully implemented. 
However, the activist was quick to note that words of advice had been helpful. One INGO 
member who had spoken with the king warned him that the 2011 opening for constitutional 
reform was likely a one time chance to make substantial change, and he and his fellow activists 
needed to seize the moment. That advice stuck with him and motivated him, but beyond that, 
INGOs did not play a role in creating the political reforms that resulted from the movement.  
 A smaller group of activists within the Hirak pushed for the constitutional changes that 
were eventually created. This group was an educated group of young people involved in the 
NGO sphere, and the group pushed for constitutional changes that reduced the some of the king’s 
power, but did not transform Jordan into a constitutional monarchy. One activist involved in this 
group said that they did not believe Jordan was ready for a constitutional monarchy. However, 
the changes that the government implemented were considered radical at the time, and went 
beyond what most people thought was possible (Interviewee K, personal communication, 
December 3, 2018). This change was largely possible because of the fact that the independent 
Hirak had gained the trust of ordinary people.  
However, the Hirak movement was not able to generate a more substantial impact on the 
government for a number of reasons, many of them having to do with how foreign influence 
played and did not play a role. For one, the Hirak movement was not completely free from the 
influence of foreign governments and movements. A number of participants in the protests were 
inspired by foreign political movements, including members of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
Hezbollah supporters, and Baathists, a fact that has been used by the Jordanian government to 
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discredit the movement. The Jordanian government has used the same reasoning to discredit the 
Islamic Action Front Party (Barari, 2013). The government also worked hard to disrupt the 
power of the movement by arresting and sowing rumors about anyone they perceived to be a 
leader. In addition, many of the people in Hirak did not know what strategies to use to put 
substantial change into place. While the work of the young activists who came up with the final 
proposals was significant for what it did, the suggestions were still written by a small group of 
people who were not lawyers or policymakers (Interviewee L, personal communication, 
December 3, 2018). Barari attributes the lack of more substantial political reforms partially as a 
result of Hirak’s lack of foreign partners, and the lack of a comprehensive foreign policy from 
the western world prioritizing democratic change in Jordan (H. Barari, personal communication, 
November 25, 2018). A representative from a government development organization said that he 
personally would like to see more engagement with marginalized, rural, politically-empowered 
communities, but there is not a lot of space to work with Hirak without risking breaking 
relationships with the Jordanian government and key pro-government partners, which his 
organization’s country of origin needs to maintain in order to achieve key security interests 
(Interviewee O, personal communication, December 6, 2018). Broader foreign policy interests of 
the West keep western countries from supporting Hirak—whether that is for better or for worse 
is ultimately a question up for debate. 
 At the same time, it is important to recognize that Hirak gained momentum partially due 
to historical events, and lost momentum for the same reasons. The crisis in Syria led to an easy 
argument for the government and the monarchy to make—stability and security are more 
important than democracy. For most Jordanians, and the western world, this was a highly 
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compelling argument, and allowed the government to make shallow reforms without a 
significant amount of public criticism (Amos, 2013).  
For groups like Shaghaf, a lack of foreign funding can be a detriment as well as an asset. 
While their independence gives them credibility and support, their lack of a strong financial 
footing makes them unsustainable. Because such groups provide no way for the people who run 
them to earn a living, organizers must seek regular employment to support themselves and their 
families, resulting in political movements dying from a loss of human capital.  
Lack of foreign funding also cannot be taken for granted as an instigator of change. 
Groups like Shaghaf have pushed for change at a local level and have kept parliamentarians on 
their toes by holding them accountable, using their independence and lack of structure in order to 
accomplish tasks quickly and efficiently. But at the end of the day, they are not pushing for 
systemic change in the government. The fact that activist movements are not institutionalized 
and generally have few inner connections generally results in such movements being left out of 
major meetings and decisions, reducing their ability to create influence (Interviewee E, personal 
communication, November 19, 2018). A lack of foreign involvement is not an independent 
predictor of whether a group will succeed. In the case of Hirak, public protest—a tactic that was 
not possible under a western funded model—put enough pressure on the government that it felt 
the need to adopt reforms.  
The Islamic Action Front Party, which also does not receive foreign funding (as political 
parties in Jordan are forbidden to receive foreign funding) has been the most active political 
party in pushing for political reform and is one of the few groups continuing to advocate for 
constitutional and legislative reform. And unlike the Hirak and Shaghaf groups, they have 
remained strong in their advocacy long past the Arab Spring. One IAF member stated that IAF’s 
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independence from foreign governments gave it a significant amount of credibility in the public 
eye. However, she also said that foreign governments have a positive impact when they issue 
statements against unfair elections and government practices. For example, after a 2007 election 
that was widely believed to be rigged against the IAF Party, western groups brought attention to 
the issue (Interviewee F, personal communication, November 19, 2018). But again, nothing 
really changed until the protests in 2011 and 2012.  
 Independent political movements gain credibility and support among Jordanians—
especially rural Jordanians—because they are independent. But their independence from western 
governments also leaves many of them unsustainable. In addition, the Jordanian government has 
used the influence of foreign political movements on the Hirak and the Islamic Action Front 
Party as a reason to discredit them and make excuses for controlling them. However, as Barari 
suggests, such government action may have been harder to do had foreign governments been 
more actively supportive of the Hirak movement.  
Conclusion/Summary 
 “We don’t push the Jordanian government too much because we want to achieve mutual 
interests,” said Interviewee O, a democracy practitioner from a western government 
organization.  “Until there’s a more representative system in parliament, the street will be the 
most effective way of creating change.”  
 While this study analyzes a wide variety of effects of foreign involvement, its main 
conclusion is that foreign involvement affects political reform organizations through their 
strategic interests. In the case of INGOs, the interests of donor governments to maintain a 
relationship with the Jordanian government in other areas of policy, such as security, keep the 
government from pushing for more systemic reform. In the case of NGOs, the interests of donor 
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governments redirects funding to areas they see as a higher priority—in recent years, the Syrian 
refugee crisis. Donor interests also influence the kinds of programming NGOs are able to do—
but without foreign funding, such programming likely would not exist at all. In addition, contrary 
to what I predicted in my hypothesis, foreign involvement does not appear to have a significant 
impact on INGO/NGO programming.  In the case of organizations that do not have foreign 
influence, the lack of foreign involvement gives them increased credibility and standing among 
Jordanians, allowing them to build the numbers to put real pressure on the government. 
However, the Hirak movement’s lack of international allies also made it weak at the negotiating 
table.  
My main hypotheses about the role of foreign involvement, built on the work of previous 
scholars, were generally correct. Strategic interests play a key role in how both INGOS and 
NGOs are able to implement programming, foreign funding projects tend to fall into the category 
of “tame” democracy promotion, and independent political movements tend to be better at 
putting pressure on the government to create change, although pressure alone has not been 
enough. However, my hypothesis was incorrect on one count.  I initially believed that foreign 
involvement would hurt the credibility and programming of INGOs and NGOs in significant 
ways, due to negative perceptions of western interference. However, I found that INGO and 
NGO services were generally well-accepted among Jordanians, and while some people viewed 
them with skepticism, the fact that they were western-based did not have a major negative impact 
on their effectiveness.  
     Yom and Barari argue that foreign involvement has not been a major factor in why the 
political landscape of Jordan has not changed. However, while not the sole variables in the 
equation for democracy, foreign involvement and the lack thereof still have major impacts on the 
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ability of political reform organizations to contribute to democratic change. Understanding the 
ways in which foreign involvement impacts organizations can allow scholars, policymakers, and 
activists to better understand the ways in which foreign policy and international coalitions affect 
the chances of political reform happening in Jordan. This analysis can hopefully guide 
democracy practitioners in understanding the different ways that state and personal interests play 
a role in shaping organizational practices and impact.  
Study Limitations 
 One major limitation was the regional limitation of the study. As I did not have access to 
safe and inexpensive transportation outside Amman, I was restricted to only interviewing people 
within the city. However, I managed to somewhat overcome this obstacle by interviewing people 
whose organizations were based outside of Amman and people who had worked significantly in 
rural areas. Still, this study may not give the most well-rounded view of political reform 
organizations in the rural parts of Jordan. 
 Another limitation was the time limit to the study. Because we were only given four 
weeks to conduct research, I was not able to interview many of the contacts I had gathered 
through other sources.  
 Another limitation was my knowledge of Arabic. While I was able to use an interpreter 
for one of my interviews, most of my interviews were conducted in the interviewees’ second 
language. Although almost all of the interviewees were highly proficient in English, the language 
barrier left some room open for the possibility of mistranslation or misunderstanding.   
Recommendations for Future Study 
  Future studies could certainly build on some of the questions raised in this research. One 
of the major questions this research leaves unanswered concerns the impact of INGO/NGO 
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political training participation on long-term political involvement or involvement in activism.  
Such an analysis would do a great deal to access the impact of such civic trainings in creating 
change. Analyzing the comparative impact of different international donors (for example, 
USAID, IRI, KAS, etc.) through a side-by-side set of case studies would give greater insight into 
what specific donors lead to specific organizational impacts. Comparing the effectiveness of 
similar programs across INGO/NGO lines (for example, comparing INGO political party 
development programs with NGO political party programs) would be.a very useful way of 
comparing the impacts of INGOs and NGOs without having to be concerned about the 
significant variable of program type. Looking into these questions and questions along similar 
lines would help provide democracy practitioners with great insight into how political reform 
organizations work and how foreign involvement affects them.   
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Appendices 
 
Sample Interview Questions  
 
1. How did you begin to work at this organization? 
2. What are your short-term and long-term goals? 
3. How successful have you been in achieving in your short and long-term goals? 
4. What are the major challenges you have faced in achieving your short and long-term goals? 
5. How do you think foreign involvement and funding affects your organization? 
6. Are you trying to push for more long-term systemic change or short-term change? Why do 
you choose to push for short-term (or) long-term change?  
7. (For organizations that work with government ministries and/or RONGOs) Why do you 
choose to work with government ministries and/or RONGOs? 
8. What do you think about the impact of INGOs on political reform? How does their foreign-
ness affect them? 
9.  What do you think about the impact of local NGOs on political reform? How does their 
foreign funding affect them? How does the fact that they are locally-based affect them? 
10. What do you think about the impact of independent political movements on political 
reform? How does their independence affect them? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
53 
Informed Consent Form 
 
 
Title: The Effects of Foreign Involvement on the Efficacy of Political Reform Organizations in 
Jordan 
 
Your Name/Homeschool: Sravya Tadepalli, University of Oregon 
 
School for International Training—Jordan: Geopolitics, International Relations, and the Future 
of the Middle East 
 
1. The purpose of this study is to assess the effects of foreign involvement on political reform 
organizations in Jordan. 
2. Rights Notice 
If at any time, you feel that you are at risk or exposed to unreasonable harm, you may 
terminate and stop the interview. Please take some time to carefully read the statements 
provided below. 
a. Privacy - all information you present in this interview may be recorded and 
safeguarded. If you do not want the information recorded, you need to let the 
interviewer know. 
 
b. Anonymity - all names in this study will be kept anonymous unless the participant 
chooses otherwise.  
 
c. Confidentiality - all names will remain completely confidential and fully protected by 
the interviewer. By signing below, you give the interviewer full responsibility to uphold 
this contract and its contents. The interviewer will also sign a copy of this contract and 
give it to the participant. 
3. Instructions: 
Please read the following statements carefully and mark your preferences where indicated.  
Signing below indicates your agreement with all statements and your voluntary participation in 
the study.  Signing below while failing to mark a preference where indicated will be interpreted 
as an affirmative preference.  Please ask the researcher if you have any questions regarding this 
consent form. 
I am aware that this interview is conducted by an independent undergraduate researcher with the 
goal of producing a descriptive case study on the effects of foreign involvement on political 
reform organizations in Jordan. 
 
I am aware that the information I provide is for research purposes only. I understand that my 
responses will be confidential and that my name will not be associated with any results of this 
study. 
 
I am aware that I have the right to full anonymity upon request, and that upon request the 
researcher will omit all identifying information from both notes and drafts.  
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I am aware that I have the right to refuse to answer any question and to terminate my 
participation at any time, and that the researcher will answer any questions I have about the 
study. 
 
I am aware of and take full responsibility for any risk, physical, psychological, legal, or social, 
associated with participation in this study. 
 
I am aware that I will not receive monetary compensation for participation in this study, but a 
copy of the final study will be made available to me upon request. 
 
I [   do   /   do not   ] give the researcher permission to use my name and position in the final 
study. 
 
I [   do   /   do not   ] give the researcher permission to use my organizational affiliation in the 
final study. 
 
I [   do   /   do not   ] give the researcher permission to use data collected in this interview in a 
later study. 
 
Date:       Participant’s Signature:    
_______________________________  
 _______________________________ 
 
       Participant’s Printed Name: 
_______________________________ 
 
       Researcher’s Signature: 
       _______________________________ 
 
Thank you for participating! 
Questions, comments, complaints, and requests for the final written study can be directed to: 
Dr. Raed Altabini, SIT Jordan Academic Director 
Email: raed.altabini@sit.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
